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Abstract 
Social movements in the wake of the financial crisis have shifted from the counter-summits 
and world social forums of the global justice movement to the camps of the anti-austerity 
mobilizations, and from a clear focus on building ‘another Europe’ to more domestically 
embedded issues. Among other reasons, this turn away from the EU can be linked to 
contracting political opportunities for social justice movements at the European level. This 
article addresses the closure of opportunities at the EU level for the work of social 
movement groups campaigning on specific EU policies. We reflect on the complexity of 
the EU’s political opportunity structure prior to the financial crisis, before examining 
changes to the EU’s architecture effected through responses to the crises and outlining 
arguments on how EU level opportunities around socio-economic issues in particular have 
shrunk as a result. We then show how the perception of other political opportunities at the 
EU level is affected by the austerity response by drawing on campaigns that sought to 
exploit new opportunities included in the Lisbon Treaty and designed to increase citizens’ 
input. Opportunities introduced by changes made in the Lisbon Treaty are perceived 
through the prism of contracted opportunities flowing from power shifts caused by the 
response to the financial crisis.  
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Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 and hit parts of the European Union (EU) 
with full force in 2010 led to the implementation of an austerity agenda of wide-ranging 
cuts. Protests against the political systems that were seen as having caused the crisis and 
against the authors of an unnecessary austerity agenda spread throughout the EU. In many 
cases, protests adopted an innovative format such as the ‘Indignados’ and Occupy 
movements. Activists occupied public spaces throughout the member states of the EU, 
setting up long-lasting camps, where they engaged in the kind of democracy they wished 
to see implemented on a wider scale: they practiced direct democracy, and worked in 
horizontal organizational forms that sought to avoid hierarchy. The camps were thus highly 
prefigurative manifestations, stressing their rootedness in everyday life. In this, they 
provide a clear contrast with the previous large protest wave of the global justice movement 
(GJM), whose global focus was expressed through frequent transnational protests as well 
as the aims and discussions held at social forums, where it was argued that ‘another Europe 
is possible’. In addition, the broad GJM network included groups that engaged with the EU 
in particular on its own terms, such as European level trade union organisations (della Porta 
and Parks 2015). While attempts to scale anti-austerity protests up to the European level 
are clear, we thus argue that their rhythms and forms were strongly embedded in specific 
domestic timings and characteristics of the global financial crisis (della Porta 2015; della 
Porta 2016).  
 
This general shift from the counter-summits and world social forums of the GJM to the 
camps of the anti-austerity mobilizations in the EU has been linked to a declining interest 
by domestic mass movements, as well as EU social movement organisations (those that 
engage in more targeted, EU-level campaigns on specific European policies and 
legislation) in addressing EU institutions (Pianta and Gerbaudo 2015). Elsewhere, we have 
argued that this turn away from the EU may also be read as a strategic choice in light of 
closing opportunities at the European level (della Porta and Parks 2015). In this reading, 
hunkering down at national and local levels does not signal some kind of failure to address 
the EU, but rather a strategic decision taken on the basis of evidence that signals the EU 
and its institutions is unlikely to respond to protests against austerity. Having analysed this 
with reference to mass movements (ibid.), here we discuss whether the political 
opportunity structure of the EU has changed in a long-term sense since the beginning of 
the crisis. In doing so, we seek also to assess the interaction between, on the one hand, 
social movements and contestation following the onset of the global economic crisis and 
subsequent ‘age of austerity’, and on the other hand, the formal channels of influence that 
exist within the European Union. As such, we address the question of whether the EU has 
opened up or closed down possibilities for new alternatives to emerge, especially within 
the formal sphere of EU decision-making. 
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In studies of social movements, political opportunity approaches explain social 
movements’ actions as rational courses followed in the light of perceived options, 
possibilities, and barriers present in political contexts. Different, generally rather stable and 
institutionalised, aspects of a political context are understood to contribute to how far a 
decision-making space is ‘open’ or ‘closed’ to movements. Classifying some of these 
aspects allows scholars to make some sense of social movements’ actions and outcomes. 
Studies by US authors such as Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow and Doug McAdam refined 
the approach, focusing on dynamic political opportunities linked to less institutionalised 
aspects of the political landscape such as shifts within ruling elites, wars, or electoral 
instability to explain collective action (Tarrow, 1998). With the proliferation of variables 
considered, the approach has been further specified to distinguish between ‘fixed’ and 
‘dynamic’ opportunities (Koopmans 1999), and to define the exact aims of different studies 
– to explain mobilisation or influence (on this and for a more detailed account of the 
evolution of the approach see e.g. Meyer 2004). The approach has been criticized, however, 
not least for reducing movements’ rational decisions to the sphere of political goals alone, 
and, in reference to movements in times of crisis, for a focus on opportunities rather than 
threats as triggers of collective mobilization (della Porta 2015).  
 
While recognizing that many strategic and other reasons may account for social 
movements’ downward shift towards the national level, our discussion here will focus on 
the stable (fixed) political opportunities of the EU as one important piece in that puzzle. In 
particular, we are interested in beginning a discussion around evidence of long-term change 
for the work of social movement groups campaigning on specific EU policies. To open this 
debate, we first briefly present the EU’s political opportunity structure, stressing the 
complexity of opportunities according to power balances in different types of EU decision-
making processes, and refer to a range of social movement organisation campaigns on 
social and environmental issues to illustrate.2 We then examine some changes in these 
opportunities in more depth, and present reflections on the closing down of EU-level 
political opportunities during the Great Recession, especially around socio-economic 
issues. 3  Third, we discuss two changes related to the Lisbon treaty (consent for the 
European Parliament over the signature of international trade agreements and the European 
Citizens’ Initiative) intended to increase citizen influence around EU decision making but 
with limited results, drawing on campaigns around the Anti-counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement and the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) on the right to water and sanitation 
to illustrate.4 This leads to reflections on the perception of opportunities, which we argue 
are shaped at the EU level by the actions of EU institutions in the aftermath of the crisis. 
The opportunities introduced by changes made in the Lisbon Treaty are perceived through 
the prism of contracted opportunities flowing from power shifts caused by the response to 
the financial crisis.  
 
                                                        
2 Drawing on Parks (2015). 
3 Drawing on della Porta (2015). 
4 Drawing on Parks (2015). 
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Before the crisis: Campaigning and EU political opportunities  
 
Scholarly work on political opportunities and obstacles tied specifically to the EU is 
relatively limited. Among the first to write on the subject, Marks and McAdam (1999) 
suggest that movement groups are likely to engage in less contentious forms of engagement 
in the EU, becoming more institutionalised in response to the fact that the Commission is 
open to dialogue with ‘stakeholders’ (see ibid and Imig and Tarrow 2001). Other work on 
EU political opportunities reaches similar conclusions, describing an information-hungry 
Commission (see for example Balme and Chabanet 2002, p. 24). As the institution that 
drafts legislation, the Commission is an important target for those seeking to influence the 
EU, the expectation of this literature is that lobbying strategies will be also be chosen by 
social movement organisations in this scenario, leading to some degree of 
institutionalisation. Yet this conclusion overlooks the fact that the Commission is far from  
unitary (Parks 2015). The cultures and interests of different departments are often played 
off against one another in internal power struggles, and policy coordination between 
departments is low (Peterson 1997). Which department holds power over an issue as well 
as that department’s relationships with various groups tempers the open character of the 
Commission (Ruzza 2005). A campaign on the REACH chemicals regulation adopted in 
2006 illustrates these points. DG Environment was the department originally responsible 
for the legislation, and the influence of environmental and public health groups on a White 
Paper was strong. Later, responsibility was transferred to DG Enterprise. Industry groups 
were then able to provide expert information and influence draft legislation, with 
environmental and public health groups often shut out from debate (Parks 2015). The 
opportunities for dialogue offered by the Commission thus vary according to the relations 
between campaigning groups and responsible departments, and strategic choices will 
likewise vary. 
 
Movement groups campaigning in the EU do not focus solely on the Commission for this 
very reason. The European Parliament (EP) is another point where social movement 
organisations attempt to influence EU decisions, and the power of this institution has 
increased over time. As a plural, elected assembly, the EP is a potential target for 
unconventional, grassroots-oriented strategies as its members are reasoned to be more 
likely to respond to citizens’ demands (Parks 2015). The chances for challengers to be 
heard are however influenced by some characteristics of this body, in particular 
ideological, geographical and inter-institutional cleavages (Crespy 2013, pp. 395-6). 
Ideology refers to the party affiliations of members, meaning that natural constituencies 
may exist that partner them and some social movement organisations. In terms of 
opportunities, however, no single party has ever formed an absolute majority in the EP, 
and campaigning groups may seek positions that convince all political persuasions. This is 
clear in the case of European level trade union organisations and the socialist group in the 
EP. In the campaign on the Directive on Services in the Internal Market, trade union groups 
were careful to concentrate their work in the EP on members from other political groupings 
to secure a compromise deal, for example (Parks 2015). Geographical cleavages also exist 
in the Parliament. Where an issue attracts a great deal of attention in one or a number of 
member states, and public opinion takes a clear direction, members from those countries 
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may follow an electoral logic and vote in order to gain citizens’ support (Burstein 1999). 
Geography may also be relevant where a particular policy will affect some member states 
more than others. Thus the support of an Austrian MEP played a role in a campaign by 
environmental, regional and farmers’ groups around genetically modified organisms and 
coexistence, since Austria was particularly concerned by the prospect of the cultivation of 
genetically modified crops on its territory (Parks 2015). The inter-institutional cleavage 
concerns the role of the EP in the institutional triangle with the Commission and Council, 
and the EP’s steady rise in power to co-legislator. In line with a logic whereby institutions 
seek to reinforce and expand their power, the EP may be receptive to campaigns that allow 
it to assert a stronger position vis-à-vis other EU institutions. The example of the Ports 
Directive is instructive here: after a first Directive fell as no compromise could be struck, 
a second Directive suffered the same fate, partly because the EP felt its position had not 
been given sufficient attention in a fresh draft (Leiren and Parks 2015).  
Least open to actions by EU-level groups is the Council (including the European Council). 
Although some contact with presidencies may be possible, groups who wish to influence 
this institution move campaigns to the national level, bringing national opportunity 
structures into play. Nevertheless, Council meetings can form a target for protests at the 
EU level: the mass protests of the GJM, which included groups focusing on EU legislation 
in its ranks, often targeted European Council meetings. European trade unions also hold 
annual marches at the body’s annual spring ‘social summit’. This underlines the importance 
of groups’ ability to mobilize national or grassroots members either for national campaigns 
directed at members of the Council, or for transnational protests directed straight to the EU 
level. 
In sum, while limited, EU political opportunities existed (and were perceived by) social 
movements before the financial crisis. It was not by chance that the European Social Forum 
focused its campaigns on this level in its hope to build “another Europe” (della Porta 2007; 
della Porta 2009). EU opportunities have been shown to vary according to the balance of 
power within and between institutions, which also varies at different points in the decision-
making process: movement groups are aware of this and choose strategies accordingly 
(Parks 2015). We now turn to examine how power in the EU has shifted in the wake of the 
financial crisis.  
 
In the crisis: Bailouts, the Fiscal Compact and the EU’s political opportunity 
structure 
 
The EU political opportunity structure presented above provides a point of comparison to 
consider a range of changes that have occurred since the financial crisis. In this section we 
focus on changes directly linked to the crisis, which we believe have not only changed the 
EU political opportunity structure, but have altered the perception of EU political 
opportunities in the context of a sizeable drop in public trust (della Porta and Parks 2015; 
della Porta 2007).  
In the wake of the financial crisis, power at the EU level has moved to the most 
unaccountable and opaque of the EU institutions, with  opportunities closing down 
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particularly (but not only) for groups active on issues of social justice. Various mechanisms 
lie behind this shift. 
First and foremost, the crisis was addressed within the frame of a crisis of public debt 
produced by unsustainable investments in the welfare state (Gallino 2013), by imposing 
policy choices through electorally unaccountable institutions: the European Central Bank 
(ECB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission. These 
institutions are argued to have limited democratic accountability (Greer 2013), leaving 
national democracy and sovereignty similarly weakened. These limitations on electoral 
accountability have increased especially (though not only) for countries that signed 
Memoranda of Understanding or Agreement. In what Fritz Scharpf (2011: see also Scharpf 
2013) defines as a ‘pre-emption of democracy’, these documents contain not only strict 
limits, but also detailed conditionalities (Ferrera 2016), within which governments must 
act for many years hence, leaving ‘anything resembling democracy […] effectively 
suspended for many years as national governments of whatever political color, forced to 
behave responsibly as defined by international markets and organizations, will have to 
impose strict austerity on their societies, at the price of becoming increasingly unresponsive 
to their citizens’ (Streeck 2011, 184). While national governments formally maintain the 
competence to impose extremely unpopular measures, their sovereignty is clipped by the 
lending institutions, including those of the EU.  
Alternative (counter-cyclical or heterodox) policy choices have also been excluded, as 
deflationary policies have been embedded in the very architecture of the EU. As Fritz 
Scharpf (2011) notes, while Keynesian economic policies assigned leading functions to 
fiscal policies in pursuit of the goal of full employment, monetarist-oriented EU policies 
contributed to create the crisis and its very differentiated effects in Europe. In fact, ‘the 
political crash programs, through which unlikely candidate countries had achieved an 
impressive convergence on the Maastricht criteria, had generally not addressed the 
underlying structural and institutional differences that had originally caused economic 
divergences. Once access was achieved, these differences would reassert themselves’ 
(Scharpf 2011, 173). The management of the crisis remained embedded within the 
neoliberal approach that, according to several analyses, characterizes the EU (van 
Apeldoorn, Drahokoupil, and Horn 2009). 
Specifically, increasing controls have been imposed by the Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact, 
and Two-Pack. In 1997, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) strengthened policy 
coordination, entitling EU institutions to impose corrective mechanisms where member 
states deviated from the prescriptions set by the Maastricht Treaty. As the ineffectiveness 
of the SGP was attributed to its weak enforcement capacity, new and more stringent 
instruments were developed during the crisis with the aim of imposing budget reductions 
through a detailed list of cuts to social services and public employment as well as 
deregulation of the labour market. In December 2011, the Six-Pack further broadened the 
scope of surveillance, specifying objectives and potential sanctions for all member state 
economies, particularly those within the Eurozone. Surveillance and enforcement 
capacities were increased by allowing the Commission to issue warnings via Alert 
Mechanism Reports, thus constraining a range of political decisions through the threat of 
sanctions. Country-specific medium-term objectives were set towards budget balancing. 
Passed in 2012, the Fiscal Compact is even more binding for Eurozone countries, 
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introducing rules that aim at curtailing public debt if the limit of 60 per cent of GDP is 
exceeded; a limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP on structural deficits; and a requirement that 
member states report on their national debt to the Commission and the Council along with 
the commitment to discuss any major policy reforms prior to their enactment (de la Porte 
and Heins 2015). Finally, the Two-Pack, which came into force in May 2013, ‘specifies 
objectives in budgetary policy, together with high enforcement and surveillance 
mechanisms. Its novelty is to have introduced a common budgetary timeline and rules for 
all euro area countries. The Two-Pack has a significant impact on “sovereign” budgets – 
the basis for policymaking – as it requires Member States to send their budget proposals 
for approval by the Commission and the Eurogroup, before they are submitted to national 
parliaments’ (de la Porte and Heins 2015, 18).  
A final point pertinent to arguing a change in the EU’s political opportunity structure 
concerns the power of a single member state. Specifically, Germany’s veto power has been 
stigmatized as producing EU policies in line with its national interests. ECB prescriptions 
were said to promote a ‘Brussels-Frankfurt consensus’ based upon austerity and the 
promotion of the price mechanism. As its economy developed through exports to BRICS 
countries as well as Europe, Germany ‘has a strong interest in keeping intact a 
macroeconomic regime in which monetary and fiscal policies remain credibly conservative 
and is especially wary of fiscal lassitude, which would lead to real exchange-rate 
appreciation and would thus impair export competitiveness.’ (Armingeon and Baccaro 
2012, 272). Germany’s capacity to protect this model was made particularly credible by 
the embeddedness of so-called Ordoliberalism – a neoliberal doctrine calling for state 
intervention within constitutionally settled limits (Woodruff 2014).   
All these changes have been stigmatized as challenging the very principles of legitimacy 
the EU relies upon. In fact, ‘through the supervision and control of macroeconomic 
imbalances, Europe’s praxis disregards the principle of enumerated powers and 
competences and cannot respect the democratic legitimacy of national institutions, in 
particular the budgetary powers of the parliaments’ (Joerges 2015, 87). So, ‘the 
institutional and decision making framework emerging from the crisis has created a number 
of gaps in this accountability structure. The coordinative method tends to render obsolete 
traditional mechanisms of judicial review and parliamentary control without substituting 
new models in their place’ (Dawson 2015, 43). 
In addition to these changes, which may be said to have greatly altered its political 
opportunity structure, these moves constrain democratic dialectics between government 
and opposition parties at domestic levels through either Memoranda of Understanding (as 
in Ireland, Greece and Portugal) or other forms of pressure (as in Italy and Spain) 
(Armingeon and Baccaro 2012). Significantly, parties in opposition as well as those in 
government were often compelled to sign these agreements. In parallel, EU policies have 
significantly weakened trade unions, either manoeuvring them into corporatist deals with 
few benefits or excluding them from policy-making altogether (Sacchi 2015). In terms of 
social policies, ‘the nature of EU intervention into domestic welfare states has changed, 
with an enhanced focus on fiscal consolidation, increased surveillance and enforcement of 
EU measures. Overall, this represents a radical alteration of EU integration, whereby the 
European Union is involved in domestic affairs to an unprecedented degree, particularly 
with regard to national budgets, of which welfare state spending is an important 
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component’ (Heins and de la Porte 2015, 1). In this view, the EU’s actions in the wake of 
the financial crisis have challenged the European social model, closed opportunities at the 
supranational level, and altered opportunities and even the landscape of social movement 
organisations at national levels.  
In terms of EU political opportunities, power can be seen to have shifted towards parts of 
the European Commission and the ECB. The ECB, as an independent bank following a 
logic of intervention oriented by so-called econocrats formed within orthodox economy 
(Ferrera 2016), is certainly closed to influence from social movement organisations in 
comparison to other major EU institutions. As for the European Commission, with the 
financial crisis, it is precisely those areas of the Commission that are more closed to social 
movement organisations concerned with questions of social justice that have acquired 
increased importance. As Cabral argues, ‘elite bureaucrats’ in both the ECB and the 
Commission’s DG for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) have ‘defined the 
competences and accountabilities of institutions that would later become their employers, 
and which some of them would come to lead’ (2013, 31). These actors have shaped the 
main responses to the financial crisis, framing it as related to the unsustainability of the 
welfare state and denying that the fiscal deficit was largely produced by huge state 
interventions to bail out banks (at all levels and in most countries) that had accumulated 
enormous losses thanks to the deregulation of financial markets. Even if blatantly 
unsuccessful, the ‘econocrats’’ analysis remained dominant (Ferrera 2016) since no 
alternative voice was admitted to these networks of power in the EU.  
Importantly in terms of political opportunity, this self-referentiality and increased power 
of economically-oriented actors such as DG ECFIN, the Council for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, and the ECB, all of which are oriented by a monetarist paradigm calling 
for labour market deregulation and cuts in pensions and health care (de la Porte and Heins 
2015), correspondingly curbs the power of more open EU institutions, notably the EP, and 
highlights the EU’s democratic deficit. This is noteworthy since the EP in particular has 
played a central role in previous social movement campaigns able to exert influence over 
EU policy (Parks 2015). In line with the variable political opportunity model, this power 
shift to closed sections of the EU’s architecture would lead us to expect increased use of 
protest tactics at the EU and national levels. Further details in the picture hone this 
expectation. Change in the political opportunity structure linked to the perception of 
Germany’s role in shaping reactions to the crisis suggests that movements may reduce 
actions targeting the EU. If a particular member state is seen as driving decisions, social 
movement organisations are unlikely to consider EU level campaigns a promising strategic 
choice. Finally, the EU has been seen to increase its interventions in national level 
opportunities, again altering perceptions of the utility of mounting EU level campaigns. 
These expectations are reflected in the general patterns of protest against austerity. While 
Europe has not been invisible in anti-austerity protest (Kaldor and Selchow 2016), the 
protesters that filled the Puerta del Sol and Syntagma squares were much more critical of 
neoliberal Europe than their predecessors. When visible in anti-austerity protest, Europe 
was seen as a main problem and the very identification of a European identity as 
problematic. In the words of a young activist, ‘I care about the global level, the community 
level, the regional level, … but Europe, does it still make sense among all these levels? 
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And even more, isn’t it in some way a quasi-racist concept? Why should we care about 
Europe and not the Mediterranean region?’ (ibid., 16).  
The camps which proliferated during the protests represented attempts at the prefiguration 
of alternative polities: not only were they open air spaces, they also represented places of 
encounter for citizens. By keeping the main site of protest in the open, the movements put 
a special emphasis on inclusivity, aiming to involve all. The camps were a re-claiming of 
public spaces by citizens: they were to reconstruct a public sphere in which problems could 
be discussed and solutions sought. Unlike the very temporary global convergence spaces 
of the social forums, the acampadas present themselves rather as ‘occupation and 
subversion of prominent urban public spaces’ (Halvorsen 2012, 431). In the camps, direct 
unmediated democracy was often called for. Assemblies were described by activists as 
‘primarily a massive, transparent exercise in direct democracy’ (Nez 2012, 80). Thousands 
of propositions were put forward and in part approved by consensus: on politics, economy, 
ecology, education. Following the model begun in Puerta del Sol, general assemblies in 
Madrid and beyond worked as spaces intended to be ‘transparent, horizontal, where all 
persons can participate in an equal way’ (Nez 2012, 84). In the US, like Spain or Greece, 
camps ‘quickly developed a few core institutions’ to inform and welcome all (Graeber 
2012, 240).  
The more or less permanent occupations of squares in Europe were thus seen as creating a 
new agora in publicly owned spaces (see also Gerbaudo 2012). Assemblies aimed at 
mobilizing the common people, not activists but communities of persons, with 
personalized hand-made placards and individualized messages. Collective thought would 
emerge through inclusivity and respect for the opinions of all, and a consensual, horizontal 
decision making process developed based on the continuous formation of small groups, 
which then reconvened in the larger assembly. According to David Graeber, ‘The process 
towards creative thinking is really the essence of the thing’ (2012, 23). Reacting to their 
dispossession of democratic rights by formal Memorandums of Understanding but also 
informal pressure, activists of the anti-austerity movement also claimed their right to hold 
their governments accountable for what was seen as an expropriation by unaccountable 
organisations including the EU, as well as more powerful member states (first and foremost 
Germany). National flags were carried in the occupied squares, with appeals for national 
sovereignty louder than calls for another Europe (della Porta 2015). While these appeals 
did not imply the exclusivist form of nationalism promoted by the populist Right—
expressions of solidarity with the citizens of other countries suffering similarly under 
austerity were common—references to the EU were limited and, when present, critical 
(Pianta and Gerbaudo 2016). 
The most prominent anti-austerity campaigns thus took the generally expected direction. 
In the few cases where anti-austerity campaigners did turn to the EU, the expectations are 
also borne out. First and foremost, the ECB acquired centrality as a target for protest 
campaigns. With annual demonstrations in Frankfurt, Blockupy took on some of the action 
repertoire and organization of the EU counter-summits of the previous decade, but 
developed a more radical discourse and more disruptive forms of action (on Blockupy, see 
also Scholl and Freyberg-Inan, this issue). While mobilizing tens of thousands in 
transnational protests, however, Blockupy did not see a similarly broad coalition to that 
which characterized European Forums and counter-summits at the beginning of the 
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millennium. In particular, major trade unions, often co-opted into partnership with 
government responses to the financial crisis (Kaindl 2013), did not join the protests, which 
also characterized the EU as an agent of neoliberalism. As the call for the second Blockupy 
in May 2012 stated,  
Together with the people in Southern Europe we say: “Don’t owe, don‘t pay!” and 
resist the rehabilitation of capitalism on the backs of employees as well as 
unemployed, retirees, migrants and the youth. We reject any cooperation with the 
German crisis politics, which not only has catastrophic consequences for people in 
Southern Europe, but also here, where the social division is continued permanently. 
[…] We carry our protest, our civil disobedience and resistance to the residence of 
the profiteers of the European crisis regime to Frankfurt am Main.5  
EU level campaigns also followed innovative protest forms, as expected when targeting a 
closed institution. Although some protest against the ECB developed at domestic levels, 
together with the stigmatization of its monetarist position (the Italian Draghi Ribelli is one 
example), protest against austerity often stuck to national targets such as parliaments (della 
Porta 2015). EU social policies (or the lack thereof) were also targeted by anti-austerity 
demonstrations such as the first European Strike promoted in 2013 by trade unions against 
the austerity imposed by EU institutions. This brief look at the overall patterns of anti-
austerity campaigns corroborates the argument on the perception of contracted political 
opportunities in the EU, as well as arguments on ‘a new ‘pragmatically prefigurative’ form 
of agency and subjectivity’ (Bailey et al, this issue).  
 
The Lisbon Treaty: still some Political Opportunity in the EU? 
 
In the midst of the financial crisis, mechanisms included in the Treaty of Lisbon intended 
to increase citizens’ voices in EU decision-making processes also matured and were acted 
on by movement organisations. Campaigns using these mechanisms provide initial insights 
regarding how the contraction of opportunities on issues linked directly to the financial 
crisis have affected the perception of opportunities for campaigning in general within the 
EU.  
The first of these mechanisms for citizens to express a voice concerns the signature of 
international trade agreements. The Lisbon Treaty gives the EP the power of consent over 
the signature of international trade agreements. While the EP did have to be consulted on 
international trade agreements prior to this, the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that such 
agreements may only be concluded “after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament” (Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 218). A campaign by European digital rights groups 
on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) provides an interesting example for 
discussing changing perceptions of the EU’s political opportunity structure with regard to 
this mechanism.  
Negotiations on ACTA began in 2007, though details remained obscure until Wikileaks                                                         
5 Call for Action Blockupy Frankfurt! Available at https://blockupy.org/en/call-for-action/ [accessed 21 
June 2016]. 
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published US government documents about the agreement in May 2008. The lack of clear 
information on the possible content of the trade agreement had already fuelled the concerns 
of a range of groups, and in Europe digital rights groups in particular began to work to 
campaign against it. The focus of the campaign run by European level groups was the EP 
due to its clear role in trade agreements. Their actions contributed, for example, to an EP 
resolution passed in March 2010 demanding transparency from the Commission on the 
negotiations. However, little progress on the actual rejection of ACTA had been made by 
early 2012.  
This changed in January 2012 when protests swept across the continent. The first protests 
began in Poland on 21 January 2012, while ACTA was signed by the EU and 22 member 
states on 26 January 2012. Just before these protests were those surrounding the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) in the United 
States – ‘blackouts’ of Wikipedia, Google and many other prominent websites had taken 
place on 18 January 2012, contributing to the shelving of the two acts. ACTA was 
described by many social movement groups as the ‘European version of SOPA and PIPA’. 
A flurry of activity by European politicians followed the protests: the day the agreement 
was signed the EP’s rapporteur, French MEP Kader Arif, resigned, citing the undemocratic 
nature of ACTA. On 31 January 2012 the Slovenian ambassador stated that she had “signed 
ACTA out of civic carelessness”. 6  On 3 February Poland halted ratification due to 
“insufficient consultations” prior to signing, while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia signaled that they had halted ratification procedures. On 
17 February, the Polish prime minister announced that ACTA would not be ratified at all, 
while Germany stated that it would await the outcome of the EP vote before acting. Each 
of the EP committees charged with providing opinions then passed reports recommending 
the rejection of ACTA, including the leading international trade committee, and on 4 July 
2012 the EP rejected the signature of the Agreement in plenary. 
The ACTA case shows a disconnection between two strands of a campaign. Protests were 
for the most part directed at national governments, while a European level campaign aimed 
to exploit a new power in the EP. The European level campaign pre-dated the protests and 
was well established when protests began, yet the organisers of the European campaign 
were unaware that protests had been planned in early 2012 (Parks 2015). The significance 
of this case for our argument is twofold. First, although established work against ACTA 
was underway at the EU level, grassroots groups chose to omit the EU as a targeted actor 
in their protests. The fact that the EU was not addressed during grassroots protests indicates 
that the groups involved did not consider the EU likely to respond to their demands. In 
other words, they saw little political opportunity at the EU level. As to the reasons for the 
protesters drawing these conclusions, we can only speculate. However, large amounts of 
information from digital rights groups were available online about ACTA and framed the 
agreement in terms of issues related to social justice, including threats to generic medicines 
and the fight against climate change as well as democracy and freedom of speech (Parks 
2015). Protesters clearly shared the analysis of the latter two in particular, with many 
wearing tape across their mouths as well as Guy Fawkes masks (Parks 2015). If protesters                                                         
6 ‘A New Question of Internet Freedom’. The New York Times, 05/02/2012. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/technology/06iht-acta06.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 – last accessed 
28/08/2013. 
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thus associated ACTA with social justice issues, they also rejected the EU as a target of 
their protest despite the existence of a clear mechanism for the EP to reject the agreement. 
We suggest that one reason for this choice is that protesting groups perceived the EU as 
unreceptive to demands opposed to a neoliberal trade model and in favour of social justice 
given its actions on the financial crisis detailed above. This is credible if we consider that 
the previous GJM protest wave involving grassroots protest groups addressed Europe 
regularly.  
A second mechanism aiming to increase citizen involvement in the Treaty of Lisbon is the 
European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). When an ECI petition is signed by at least 1 million 
EU citizens, and passes minimum thresholds in at least 7 member states, the matter is 
discussed at EU level. The subject matter of ECIs must relate to areas where the EU has 
the power to legislate, and importantly there is no guarantee of legislation but an obligation 
to consider: after a successful petition is received, an EP hearing is held, along with 
meetings between the organizers of the ECI and the Commission. The Commission then 
publishes a communication detailing any action it will take.  
The ECI represents a new but highly regulated opportunity to bring citizens’ opinions to 
the EU level. The rules and procedures for registering an ECI require the kind of expertise 
usually found in groups used to operating in close contact with the EU institutions: their 
subject matter must be in line with EU competence and Treaties, implying expert 
knowledge. However, the rules on ECIs also actively require or encourage cross-national 
involvement from national or local level groups. For example, the citizens’ committee that 
must support the ECI must be composed of at least 7 EU citizens living in different member 
states, and national quotas must be met in successful ECIs. Most importantly, gathering 
signatures in line within strict and varying national rules implies meaningful national 
involvement. Finally, the substantial costs incurred in launching and running an ECI mean 
that larger networks are more likely to have the necessary funding. Launching an ECI is 
thus heavy in demands for expertise and funding, making it a relatively inaccessible choice 
for many smaller or grassroots groups without EU experience, but is equally unlikely to 
succeed without the involvement of such groups in gathering signatures. More networked 
organisations are therefore in a better position to exploit the ECI opportunity.  
One of only three successful ECIs to date illustrates this point. An ECI on the right to water 
and sanitation (with the official title ‘Water and sanitation are a human right! Water is a 
public good, not a commodity!’) was registered and launched by the European Public 
Services Union. This organisation reflects the qualities mentioned above: it has a strong 
presence, expertise and resources in Brussels, but can also rely on developed networks of 
national and local trade union chapters for the collection of signatures. During their 
campaign, the EPSU also drew on the support of other national and local movement groups 
formed in long-term collaborations with water movement groups, particularly in those 
member states hardest hit by the effects of the financial crisis. Despite the heavy demands 
to be met in the ECI process, this example indicates some potential for bringing together 
EU, national and local groups to attempt to influence the EU’s direction. 
The ECI is thus a clear new opportunity in the EU’s structure. Nevertheless, the limited 
impact of the few successful ECIs to date must also be viewed through the lens of the 
discussion on the EU’s response to the financial crisis. Returning to the example of the ECI 
on the right to water and sanitation, although this campaign was successful in terms of 
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passing the thresholds required for formal consideration, there was disappointment at the 
Commission’s response, which did not include the legislation sought. A similar fate has 
befallen all other successful ECIs to date. Work suggesting that that the ECI mechanism is 
in danger of becoming an empty gesture (e.g. Bouza Garcia 2012) thus gains some 
credence. The proportion of ECIs rejected for issues of legal admissibility has increased, 
while numbers of ECI registrations have decreased and EU social movement organizations 
have pointed to low awareness of the mechanism (Anglmayer 2015). Campaigns arguing 
for simpler rules and stronger obligations for the Commission to act on successful ECIs are 
ongoing, but the perception of this mechanism as an opportunity for influencing EU 
decisions appears to have been affected. In the case of the ECI on the right to water and 
sanitation, the Commission’s decision not to legislate was seen as linked to a neoliberal 
agenda. ECI campaigners saw the EU as targeting public water provision as part of the 
wider austerity agenda of liberalization. One prominent example during the ECI campaign 
was Thessaloniki in Greece, where steps were taken to privatize water provision as part of 
the strategy to comply with the memorandum of understanding on Greece’s financial 
bailout by the EU despite local resistance including an informal referendum and 
transnational solidarity from the ECI campaign (Parks 2015). The link between a wider 
austerity agenda and the decision not to legislate on public water provision thus points once 
more to the idea that the EU’s response to the financial crisis intervenes in the perception 
of political opportunities among groups active on issues of social justice.  
 
Changing structures of opportunities: some conclusions 
 In this article we presented a discussion of the EU’s political opportunity structure before and after the start of the financial crisis. After a brief discussion of political opportunity in the EU prior to the crisis, we explored some factors we argue altered the same in subsequent years. We discussed the contraction of political opportunities stemming from the EU’s response to the financial crisis, notably through the Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact, and the Two-Pack. We then turned to discuss two changes to the EU’s structure that apparently opened new opportunities for movement influence as a result of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, namely the EP’s power of consent over the signature of international trade agreements, and the European Citizens’ Initiative. These discussions pointed to the idea that, while the Lisbon Treaty contained elements providing openings at the EU level for social movement campaigns, the worth of these opportunities is perceived as low by movement groups. Contractions in political opportunities linked to the financial crisis may function as a filter, leading movement groups to conclude that the EU is unlikely to respond to campaigns proposing changes out of line with a neoliberal programme. We provided some illustration for this idea with two cases. First, the campaign against ACTA, where protest groups directed their protests at national targets rather than work with an 
existing European level campaign. This supports the idea that there is ‘growing 
polarisation’ between EU-oriented social movement organizations and those based in 
member states in the wake of the financial crisis (Ruzza 2015: 24). Second, the ECI 
campaign united movement groups at the European, national and local levels, but 
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campaigners linked the EU’s decision not to legislate on public water services to 
liberalization within a wider austerity agenda. The lack of impact of this and other ECIs 
means this mechanism risks losing any status as a meaningful opportunity.  
We thus suggest that changes to the EU’s political opportunity structure intended to 
decrease the democratic deficit are interacting in complex ways with the closure of 
opportunities linked to the financial crisis. Given the forms and frames of the widespread 
anti-austerity protest wave in the EU in recent years, along with the ACTA and ECI 
campaigns, it is reasonable to suppose that social movement groups have a clearer 
perception of contracting opportunities at the EU level than of any openings. Admittedly, 
these suggestions are based on limited research, and are intended to develop hypotheses 
rather than test them. An interesting avenue to explore the questions raised by the cases 
presented here is the campaign around the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) between the US and the EU. This campaign has united a popular petition that has 
attracted over 3 million signatures with various protest events involving both European 
level movement organisations and national level groups. The petition had originally been 
registered as an ECI, but was rejected by the Commission as falling outside the scope of 
the ECI Regulation. The groups that launched it continued to gather signatures, organize 
various protest events, and took their case to the European Court of Justice, providing some 
evidence for a view of the ECI as a tool for protest rather than direct influence. This 
campaign may be a harbinger of new grassroots protest with a European focal point, or 
may be isolated: research on campaigns over time is necessary to reach conclusions on the 
perception of EU political opportunities in the wake of the financial crisis. 
With reference to the original proposition of this article, namely that the political 
opportunity structure of the EU has changed, we argue that the evidence is already 
conclusive. As a result of the conditions attached to bailout agreements as well as the Two-
Pack, Six-Pack and the Fiscal Compact, power at the EU level has shifted to unaccountable 
agencies (the ECB) and less open areas of the European Commission (DG ECFIN) and 
curtailed the ability of member state governments to take decisions and respond to the 
financial crisis outside the scope of the austerity agenda. These changes alone have 
contracted political opportunities at the EU level. At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty has 
introduced new opportunities such as European Parliament consent for trade agreements 
and the European Citizens’ Initiative, which also prove lasting change to the EU’s political 
opportunity structure, albeit not of a kind that appears to have opened up opportunities for 
those challenging neoliberalism. 
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